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(1993).
Civil forfeiture laws1 empower the government to seize property used or acquired illegally without providing remuneration to
the property owner. 2 Despite the efficacy of this ancient doctrine,
1 Two classes of forfeiture action exist: civil and criminal. Lalit K. Loomba, Note,
The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property ForfeitureUnder the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 471, 473 (1989) (citation omitted). Civil forfeiture
actions proceed in rem, directly against the property subject to forfeiture rather than
against the property's owner. Id. (citation omitted). In rem forfeitures descend from
a legal fiction pursuant to which property's association with an illegal act results in its
personification. Id. (citation omitted). As such, the government may name the
"tainted" property as a defendant and may adjudge the property guilty; the government does not need to convict or indict the property owner. Id. On this point, see
Beverly L.Jacklin, Annotation, Who Is Exemptfrom Forfeitureof Drug Proceeds Under "Innocent Owner" Provision of 21 USCS § 881(a)(6), 109 A.L.R. FED. 322, 330 (1992)
("[D]efendants are the properties involved, not the owner, so that the government is
not required to establish that the owner dealt in drugs but only that the properties
were corrupt to the extent that they incorporated proceeds traceable to an exchange
of controlled substances in violation of the law.").
Criminal forfeiture actions, on the other hand, proceed in personam, that is,
directly against the person; such actions supplement the prosecution. Loomba, supra,
at 473. As opposed to its civil counterpart, the criminal forfeiture of illegally acquired
property occurs only upon the conviction of the criminal defendant. Id. (citations
omitted). For additional discussion on civil versus criminal forfeiture actions, see
Michael Goldsmith and Mark Jay Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights:
The Need for FurtherLaw Reform, 1989 Dus LJ. 1254, 1260-61 (1990). For a thorough
commentary concerning the history of and distinction between in rem and in personam actions, consult William J. Hughes and Edward H. O'Connell, Jr., In Personam
(Criminal)Forfeitureand FederalDrug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition
into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 613, 617-24 (1984).
2 See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted (defining for-

feiture as "[a] comprehensive term which means a divestiture of specific property without compensation; it imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid right
without compensation."); see also United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449
F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1978) ("'[F]orfeiture'is best defined as the divestiture
without compensation of property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the
sovereign.").
Modern forfeiture dates back to an English common law practice by which the
King seized title to any inanimate objects that caused the death of a royal subject.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974). Courts
termed the offending objects "deodands," derived from the Latin "Deo dandum,"
meaning "to be given to God." Id. at 681 & n.16. The concept of the deodand in turn
derived from the Bible, in which God commanded Moses" if an ox gore [s] a man or a
woman, and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten." Id. at 681 &
n.17 (quoting Exodus 21:28). For further discussion of the historical bases of modern
day forfeiture law, see Jacob J. Fickelstein, The Goring Ox: Some HistoricalPerspectives on
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the United States historically employed forfeiture sparingly.3 In
1970, however, Congress promulgated the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, codified as 21 U.S.C. § 881, 4
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169, 181-83 (1973).
3 See Alice Marie O'Brien, Note, "Caught In The Crossfire": Protecting the Innocent
Owner of Real Propertyfrom Civil Forfeiture Under 21 US.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 521, 524-25 (1991) (citation omitted) ("[D]espite its early roots, the role of forfeiture in this country's criminal justice system has been insignificant at best."); Richard
C. Reuben, PuttingBrakes on Forfeiture,A.B.A.J., Feb. 1994, at 14 ("Forfeiture has been
around for years . . . but traditionally has been disfavored as a remedy because of
constitutional concerns.").
4 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The relevant provisions of§ 881, as
amended, read as follows:
(a) Subject property
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for
property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9) except that(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section
by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to
have been committed or omitted by any person other than such owner
while such conveyance was unlawfully in the possession of a person
other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the United
States, or of any State; and
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent
of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established
by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange
for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds
traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments,
and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of
this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
(h) Vesting of title in United States
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of
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through which it recruited civil forfeiture into its war on drugs.5
As enacted, § 881 targeted only controlled substances and
their means of manufacture and transport.6 In an effort to
heighten the Act's impact on the drug trade,7 Congress fortified
the statute in 1978 by adding § 881(a) (6).8 As amended, this section also provided for the forfeiture of proceeds traceable to drug
transactions, including property purchased with drug proceeds. 9
Congress tempered the aggressive tone of § 881(a) (6) by exempting truly innocent parties from its terms.1 0 This "innocent owner"
this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture under this section.
Id.
5 See S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1985), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374-75 ("In recent years... Federal agencies have [launched] a
concerted effort to increase the use of forfeiture in narcotics and racketeering cases.
This bill is intended to eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that have
frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture.").
The Senate Report asserted:
Today, few in the Congress or the law enforcement community fail to
recognize that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade
in dangerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant violence, is
plaguing the country. Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat
racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include
an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the
mechanism through which such an attack may be made.
Id. at 3374
6 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(1)-(5) (1988). For the text of§ 881 (a), see supra note 4.
7 See 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (1978) (statement of Sen. Nunn). With regard to the
efficacy of § 881, Senator Sam Nunn commented that "almost 8 years ago the Nixon
administration declared an 'all out war' on illegal drugs.... Until recently, we were
losing the battles as well as the war." Id.
8 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. 1993); 124 CONG. Ruc. 23,055 (statement of
Sen. Nunn) ("The amendment I propose here today is intended to enhance the efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs ...by striking out against the profits from illicit
drug trafficking."); see also supra note 4 (quoting the text of § 881(a) (6)).
9 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988); For the text of§ 881(a)(6), see supra note 4.
In its section by section analysis, the Congressional Record explains that "[w]hile
[881 (a) (6) ] broadens existing forfeiture law to enable federal authorities to reach the
consideration used or intended to be used in illegal drug transactions or any proceeds
directly traceable to such transactions, it specifically safeguards the rights of innocent
persons." 124 CONG. REc. 23,056 (1978). Speaking on the proposed addition of subsection (a) (6), Senator Culver noted that "[t]he original language is modified in the
proposed amendment in order to protect the individual who obtains ownership of
proceeds with no knowledge of the illegal transaction." Id.
The term "proceeds" is defined as "[t] hat which results... or accrues from some
possession or transaction." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1204 (6th ed. 1990) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
10 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) ("[N]o property shall be forfeited ... to the
extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
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caveat authorizes claimants to challenge a civil forfeiture and reclaim the seized property provided said claimants did not know of,
or consent to, the illegal activities giving rise to the forfeiture. 1
Congress returned to the Act in 1984,12 adding § 881(h).'
The 1984 amendment, a codification of the common law doctrine
known as "relation back," 1 4 purported to vest title to "forfeitable"
property in the United States upon the commission of an act giving
rise to forfeiture. 5 A civil proceeding, in which the forfeiture is
formally decreed, later perfects the government's interest.1 6
owner."). Speaking on the addition of the "innocent owner" provision, Senator Nunn
commented that the amendment was intended to clarify "that [if] a bona fide party...
has no knowledge or consent to the property he owns having been derived from an
illegal transaction, that party would be able to establish that fact under this amendment and forfeiture would not occur." 124 CONG. REC. 23,057 (1978).
In addition to the innocent owner provision found in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6),
Congress also provided for innocent owners in §§ 881 (a) (4) (B) and 881 (a) (7). 21
U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (B) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). Section (a)(7) provides
for the forfeiture of real property used in the violation of § 881, but adds "that no
property shall be forfeited ... to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of
any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) (1988).
11 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). For the text of§ 881(a) (6), see supra note 4.
12 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
A 1981 report by the General Accounting Office entitled Asset Forfeiture-A Seldom
Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking advised Congress that § 881 had produced
disappointing results. See S. REP.No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1985), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374. The General Accounting Office posited two reasons
for the failure: "(1) that Federal law enforcement agencies had not aggressively pursued forfeiture, and (2) that the current forfeiture statutes contain numerous limitations and ambiguities .... " Id. Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) to help rectify
these problems. See id. at 3375.
13 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). For the text of§ 881(h), see supra note 4.
14 See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1136 (1993) ("[A]s we
read that subsection . . . Congress merely codified the common-law rule.").
"Relation back" is defined as "[a] principle that an act done today is considered to
have been done at an earlier time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990; see
also 1 DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEmIU CASES, 1 3.05[2]
(1993) ("[U]nder a peculiar rule of statutory construction adopted early in the nineteenth century and followed consistently. .. thereafter, it is presumed that the legislature intends to 'vest' title in the government at the moment the property is illegally
used unless the legislature indicates otherwise. . . ."); 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at

1137 ("The common-law rule had always allowed owners to invoke defenses made
available to them before the Government's title vested, and after tide did vest, the common-law rule had always related that title back to the date of the commission of the
act ....").
15

See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (h); see also Michael J. Wietrzychowski, Note, Civil Forfeiture-

ProtectingInnocent Donees Under 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6), 65 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 250 (1992)

("Simply stated, section 881 (h) placed the government first in the chain of ownership
of any illicit drug proceeds, thus giving the government first claim rights to the
booty.").
16 SMITH, supra note 14, at 1 3.05[2] (citations omitted) ("Thus, it is said that a
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Since 1984, courts attempting to reconcile § 881 (h) with
§ 881 (a) (6) have asked one resounding question: How can a transferee of drug proceeds raise an innocent owner defense under
§ 881(a) (6) when § 881(h) has already operated to divest him?' 7
Recently, in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,'" the United
States Supreme Court furnished an answer.' 9 Specifically, the
Court opined that relation back does not preclude innocent owners from obtaining valid interests in illegal proceeds because the
government does not acquire true owner status until the forfeiture
has been decreed in a civil proceeding.2 0 In addition, the Court
asserted that the benefits of innocent ownership extend to donees
as well as to bona fide purchasers for value.2 '
judgment of forfeiture 'relates back' to the date of the offense subjecting the property
to forfeiture. Of course, this 'result follows only from an effective judgment of condemnation.' Where there is no such judgment the government acquires no title or
interest in the property."); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 24 (citation omitted) ("[T]o state the principle in a concrete form, relation back to the date of the
offense follows only from an effective judgment of condemnation.").
17 See Wietrzychowski, supra note 15, at 250 ("IFlor persons acquiring an ownership
interest after the illegal act.., the statute contained an anomaly ....The courts have
struggled with this issue and are in disagreement as to which section to apply firstsection 881 (h) or section 881 (a) (6) .

. . .");

SMITH, supra note 14, at

3.05 [1] ("The

law in this area is arcane and confused . . .even when it is clear it does not always
make much sense from a policy standpoint.").
The effect of the "relation back" doctrine on transfers occurring subsequent to the
illegal act has engendered hot debate. SeeJacklin, supra note 1, at 327. Essentially
three schools of thought have developed on the subject. See id. Some courts assert
that "relation back" vests title in the United States at the time of the illegal act, and
that said vesting nullifies all subsequent sales and alienations. Id. at 327, 335-37.
Others adhere to this view, but propose that an exception exists for "bona fide purchasers for value" who take after the prohibited event. Id. at 327, 337. Still other
courts maintain that while vesting "relates back" to the prohibited act, all innocent
owners taking subsequent to the illegal act but prior to perfection avoid the vesting
entirely. Id. at 338-39.
18 113 S.Ct. 1126 (1993). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in 92
Buena Vista Ave., see generally Holly R. Skolnick and G. Richard Strafer, Restrictionsfor
Asset Forfeitures, 134 N.J.L.J. 1476 (1993).
19 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1137 ("Because the success of any defense
available under § 881 (a) will necessarily determine whether § 881(h) applies,
§ 881 (a) (6) must allow an assertion of the defense before § 881 (h) applies.").
20 Id. at 1136.
21 Id. at 1134.
At least one commentator agrees with the Court's opinion on this issue, asserting
that
[tihe plain language of the statute indicates that the protection of the
innocent owner provision is not limited to those who give value for the
tainted property. Likewise, the legislative history shows that Congress
sought to protect all innocent owners including donees, heirs and
others who have not given value for the property.
SMrrH, supra note 14, at 4.03[4] [c].
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In 1982, Joseph Anthony Brenna gifted in excess of $200,000
to Beth Anne Goodwin, enabling her purchase of 92 Buena Vista
Avenue in Rumson, New Jersey.22 Brenna resided on the premises
with Goodwin and her three children from 1982 to 1987, during
which time the couple maintained intimate relations. 23 Following
Brenna's indictment on drug charges, the United States instituted
civil forfeiture proceedings against the property pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 881.24
In its verified complaint, the government asserted that the
funds used to purchase the residence constituted proceeds traceable to Brenna's drug transactions. 25 Subsequently, in an ex parte
proceeding, 26 the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey reviewed the complaint and authorized the seizure of
92 Buena Vista Avenue. 7
In response to the forfeiture proceedings, Goodwin moved for
22 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130; United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937
F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1991), affid, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
23 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130; 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 100.
24 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 100. Brenna's indictment alleged that he had
conspired to import and had knowingly imported into the United States over 1,000
kilograms of marijuana. Id.
See supra note 4 for the text of 21 U.S.C. § 881.
25 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (citations omitted).
David Smith, an authority in the realm of forfeiture, notes that the most significant inquiry arising under the proceeds provision is whether the government must
trace the proceeds "to a particulardrug transaction or whether it is enough to trace
'proceeds' to drug trafficking activity in general." SMITH, supra note 14, at[ 4.03[4] [a].
By way of response, Mr. Smith adds that "[t]he government, defense counsel and the
courts have acted upon the latter assumption .... " Id.
26 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130. An ex parteproceeding is"[a]nyjudicial or
quasi judicial hearing in which only one party is heard...." BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY
576 (6th ed. 1990).
27 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130. The court premised this decision on a
showing by the government that probable cause existed to believe that the property
had been purchased with the proceeds of drug transactions. Id. Pursuant to an
agreement with the United States Marshall, Goodwin remained in possession of the
premises throughout the litigation process. Id. at 1130 n.3.
After deciding 92 Buena Vista Ave., the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether it is permissible for the government to seize property subject to forfeiture
without first providing the owner both notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. United States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 497 (1993).
In James Daniel Good, the Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits such government action in all cases except those where exigent circumstances call for immediate seizure. Id. at 497. Moreover, the Supreme Court asserted that the confiscation of
property under § 881(a) (7) does not give rise to the kind of extraordinary circumstances that verify the government's deferral of proper notice and hearing. Id. at 505.
To establish the existence of exigent circumstances, the Court noted, the government
must demonstrate that less restrictive measures would be insufficient to protect the
government's interest in the property. Id.
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dismissal on several grounds, among them, that she qualified as an
innocent owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6) .2 a Goodwin buttressed this claim by swearing that she had no knowledge of the
money's illicit origin.29 The district court denied Goodwin's motion, holding that the innocent owner defense protected only bona
fide purchasers for value, not donees.30 The lower court also
found that the relation back doctrine, as embodied in § 881(h),
precluded Goodwin from acquiring an ownership interest in the
property."'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected the district court's interpretation of § 881 (a) (6)
and concluded that the innocent owner defense embraced not
only bona fide purchasers for value, but also donees3 2 The court
28 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 856 (D.N.J. 1990), affd,
937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), affd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). In addition to her claim of
innocent ownership, Goodwin moved for dismissal based on the following claims: (1)
that the seizure was unconstitutional because it was effected without a pre-seizure
hearing; (2) that the verified complaint was partially premised on immunized testimony; (3) that the government's seizure was unduly delayed, violating both her due
process rights and the applicable statute of limitations; and (4) that the government
had refused to abide by the rules of discovery. Id.
29 Id. at 859. Goodwin "assert[ed] that she had no knowledge that the funds ...
were traceable to drug sales; that the premises were used to facilitate drug sales.., or
that Mr. Brenna had a record of violating any laws." Id. One commentator has noted
the extensive latitude that § 881 (a) (7) allows for defenses based upon such lack of
knowledge. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 14.03(1] ("[U] nlike virtually every other federal
civil forfeiture statute, this subsection and subsection (a) (7) exempt property owned
by persons without knowledge of the facts that would otherwise subject the property
to forfeiture, thus allowing for a broad defense based upon ignorance.")
30 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. at 860 (citation omitted). The district court
buttressed this conclusion by noting that the innocent owner provision of 21 U.S.C.
§ 835(c), the criminal forfeiture statute, explicitly protected only bona fide purchasers for value. Id. at 860-61 (citation omitted). The court further premised its holding
on the settled principle that those lacking legal title to property may not validly transfer title except where the transferee qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value. Id. at
861. Finally, the district court observed, "where fraudulent conveyances are made,
bona fide purchasers for value may be protected, but recipients of gifts are not." Id.
(citation omitted).
31 Id. at 860. The court noted that the language of § 881 (a) (6) "implies that the
acts or omissions giving rise to forfeiture must be committed after the third party acquires a legitimate ownership interest in the property." Id.
32 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1991), affd,
113 S.Ct. 1126 (1993). The court of appeals articulated three bases supporting its
conclusion. Id. at 101-02. First, the court explicated, the plain language of the statute
contained no limitations on the word "owner." Id. at 101. Second, the Third Circuit
added, legislative history indicated that courts should construe the term "owner"
broadly. Id. at 101-02 (citation omitted). Third, the court concluded, there existed a
purposeful distinction between § 881 (a) (6) and the criminal forfeiture statute, the
latter's application being explicitly confined to bona fide purchasers for value. Id. at
102 (citation omitted).
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of appeals also disagreed with the lower court's explication of
§ 881(h), holding instead that the relation back doctrine did not
apply to property exempted from forfeiture by way of the innocent
ownership defense.3 1 Subsequently, the court remanded the matter to determine whether Goodwin qualified as an innocent
4

owner.3

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" to resolve whether a donee of drug proceeds, who uses those proceeds
to purchase real property, may assert an innocent owner defense
despite the relation back doctrine. 3 6 Adopting the Third Circuit's
reasoning, the Court explained that vesting under § 881(h) occurs
only after the United States has obtained ajudgement of forfeiture
and that, in the interim, valid title may pass to an innocent
owner. 3' The Court added that § 881(h) applies only to property
"forfeitable" under § 881 (a).8 Since proceeds transferred to innocent parties are exempt, the Court reasoned, such proceeds are
not "forfeitable" and § 881 (h) is inapplicable. 39 Endorsing the
Third Circuit's construction of the word "owner," the Supreme
Court added that limiting the defense to bona fide purchasers contradicted the statute's plain language.4 °
Since 1984, courts have endeavored to reconcile the "relation
back" doctrine of § 881(h) with the "innocent owner" proviso of
33 Id. The court opined that "to interpret section 881(h) in the manner suggested
by the government would essentially serve to emasculate the innocent owner defense
provided for in section 881(a)(6)." Id. No person obtaining property after the alleged drug transaction, the court continued, would be able to assert the innocent
owner defense. Id.
34 Id. at 103, 105.
35 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 112 S. Ct. 1260, 1261 (1992).
36 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1127, 1129.
37 See id. at 1136-37 (reasoning that § 881(h) applies only to property that is subject to forfeiture under § 881(a)); 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102 ("Section
881 (h) vests title in the United States in thatproperty described in subsection (a).... [TIhe
property referred to in subsection (a) does not include property that has been exempted from forfeiture by means of an innocent owner defense.").
38 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136 (footnote omitted). The court explained
that "the Government cannot profit from the common-law doctrine of relation back
until it has obtained ajudgment of forfeiture. And it cannot profit from the statutory
version of that doctrine in § 881(h) until respondent has had the chance to invoke
and offer evidence to support the innocent owner defense under § 881 (a) (6)." Id. at
1137.
39 Id. at 1136-37.
40 Id. at 1134; see 937 F.2d at 102 (holding that Congress intended "owner" to be
defined broadly for the purposes of § 881, thereby including within its scope donees
as well as bona fide purchasers for value).
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§ 881 (a) (6).41 The question, whether the relation back doctrine
precludes the innocent ownership of proceeds, has evoked sundry
responses. 42 Some courts have responded in the affirmative, asserting that "relation back" vests title in the United States at the time of
the illegal act and that this vesting nullifies all subsequent sales and
transfers.43 Other courts have adhered to this view, but proposed
that a common-sense exception exists in "bona fide purchasers for
value."" Still other courts have recognized that vesting "relates
back" to the prohibited act, but have declared that this vesting does
not affect innocent owners who take after the prohibited act but
41 SeeJacklin, supra note 1, at 327 (describing the different positions that courts
have taken on the effect of § 881 (h)'s relation back provision).
42 See id.
43 See, e.g., Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242, 248 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[F]orfeiture
under section 881 occurs before value is received by the vendor .... Forfeiture therefore occurs while the value is still in the hands of the purchaser .... "). Courts adhering to this view frequently cite United States v. Stowell 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890), a
nineteenth century decision which contains perhaps the most famous explication on
retroactive vesting in the context of forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., Eggleston, 873 F.2d at
247 (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Stowell made it clear that an innocent owner exception does not prevent the relation back of forfeiture in cases where
holders do not meet the exception's qualifications). In Stowelg the Court established
the following:
[W] henever a statute enacts that upon the commission of a certain act
specific property used in or connected with that act shall be forfeited,
the forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act;
the right to the property then vests in the United States, although their
title is not perfected until judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the United States at the time the
offense is committed, and the condemnation, when obtained, relates
back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even
to purchasers in good faith.
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added); accord United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 398, 405 (1814) ("[T]he commission of the offence marks the point of time
on which the statutory transfer of right takes place."); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 246, 311 (1818) ("[Florfeiture... attach[es] at the moment of the commission of the offence, and.., from that moment, the title of plaintiff would be completely devested . . . ."). But see United States v. Grundy and Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 337, 350-51 (1806) ("at common law, nothing vests... until some legal step
shall be taken... after which ... the doctrine of relation carries back the title to the
commission of the offense . . . .") (emphasis added).
44 See, e.g. United States v. One 1983 Mercedes Benz 380SL, No. 89-3123, 1991 WL
276262, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1991) ("[W]e hold that one who claims to be a subsequent bonafide purchaser for value and without notice has standing to assert the innocent owner defense under 21 U.S.C. [§] 881 (a) (4) (C)."); see also United States v. 92
Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 861 (D.N.J..1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.
1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (citation omitted) (noting that "it is a traditional
rule of law that those who do not have legal title to property cannot validly transfer it
to others, and certain exceptions to this rule apply only where the transferee is a bona
fide purchaser for value").
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before a judicial decree. 5
Eggleston v. Colorado46 typifies those courts that have read
§ 881 (h) to the exclusion of § 881(a) (6).' 7 In Eggleston, officials
seized drug proceeds, in the form of $1.5 million in cash and
twelve ounces of gold, from the home of Albert Levy.4 8 Thereafter,
the Colorado Department of Revenue (the Department) claimed
entitlement to the sales tax owed by Levy as a result of his drug
transactions.4 9 Citing Colorado law,5 0 the Department asserted
that Levy never actually owned the sales tax proceeds but, rather,
that he held the funds as the state's trustee.5" On this basis, the
Department characterized itself as an innocent owner of the sales
tax portion of the proceeds under § 881 (a) (6).52
45 See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1991), affid,
113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (holding that § 881(h) does not pertain to property exempted
from forfeiture by the innocent owner defense).
46 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989).
47 See id. at 248 (citations omitted) ("The innocent owner exception applies only
to owners whose interest vests prior to the date of the illegal act that forms the basis of
the forfeiture."); see also United States v. $41,305, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(citation omitted) ("Illegal use immediately vests title to the property in the sovereign, and cuts off the rights of third parties to obtain legally protectible interests in
the property."); In re Lot 8, Block 4 of Summit Hills, 763 F. Supp. 150, 151 (W.D.N.C.
1991) ("Even the innocent owner of property cannot obtain an interest in property if
the illegal acts which subject the property to forfeiture occurred prior to the innocent
owner obtaining his interest."); United States v. Sixth Dist. & Third Section of Gordon
County, 762 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("[An innocent owner's interest]
must predate the right of forfeiture asserted by the United States."); United States v.
5854 N. Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 208 (N.D. I11.1991) (quoting In re One 1985
Nissan 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1317 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[N]o third party can acquire a
legally valid interest in the property forfeited from anyone other than the government
after the illegal act takes place."); United States v. 127 Shares of Stock in Paradigm
Mfg., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 581, 584 (E.D. Cal. 1990) ("Under the 'relation back' doctrine codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(h), the property is forfeit as of the time of the illegal
act giving rise to the forfeiture.").
48 Eggleston, 873 F.2d at 243 (citation omitted). Following the seizure, a number of
parties asserted an interest in the seized property. Id. (citation omitted).
49 Id. at 244 (citations omitted).
50 Id. at 247. The relevant Colorado statute provides, in pertinent part, that "sums
of money paid by the purchaser to the retailer as taxes ... remain ... the property of
the state of Colorado, in the hands of such retailer, and he shall hold the same in
trust.. . ." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-26-118(1) (West 1990).
51 Eggleston, 873 F.2d at 247. The Department relied on a Colorado statute that
states:
[a]ll sums of money paid by the purchaser to the retailer as taxes imposed by this article shall be and remain public money, the property of
the state of Colorado, in the hands of such retailer, and he shall hold
the same in trust for the sole use and benefit of the state of Colorado
until paid to the executive director of the department of revenue ....
Id. at 247 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-26-118 (West 1990)).
52 Id. at 247-48.
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Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge Tachta rejected the Department's claim and explained that the Department's interest in
the sales tax arose after the illegal acts transpired.5 3 The United
States's interest in the funds, the judge contrasted, vested at the
moment the drug purchaser intended to relinquish those funds for
drugs.5 4 Judge Tachta concluded that the relation back of the
United States's interest, pursuant to § 881(h), prevented the Department from asserting an innocent owner defense.5 5
Temporally and substantively akin to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Eggleston is the Fourth Circuit's decision in In re One 1985
Nissan 300ZX 5 6 In that case, an investigation into the murder of
alleged drug trafficker Dennis White led Maryland authorities to
seize sundry property believed to be the spoils of his drug transactions.5 7 White's heirs contested the forfeiture, claiming to qualify
as innocent owners under § 881 (a) (6).58
Judge Widender, writing for the court, steadfastly rejected the
heirs' claim. 9 Attempting to reconcile §§ 881 (a) (6) and 881 (h),
the court firmly announced that "relation back" necessarily limits
innocent owners to those whose interests in the seized property
pre-date the illegal act. 60 According to the court, subsequent tak53 Id. The court noted that the payments referred to in the Colorado tax code do
not become the property of the Department until the purchaser actually gives value to
the retailer. Id. (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-26-118(1) (West 1990)).
54 Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1988)). The court selectively quoted from
§ 881 (a) (6), stressing that the forfeiture "applies to '[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any
person in exchange for a controlled substance."' Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6)

(1988)).
55 Id. The court noted that the Department could not qualify as an innocent
owner because title to the drug proceeds vested in the federal government before the
state held an ownership interest. Id. In support of this proposition, the court stated
that "[t] he innocent owner exception applies only to owners whose interest vests prior
to the date of the illegal act that forms the basis for the forfeiture." Id. (citations
omitted).
56 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989). Like the Tenth Circuit in Eggleston, the Fourth
Circuit in In re One 1985 Nissan held that the innocent owner defense of § 881 (a) (6)
does not apply to property interests that arise after an illegal act occurs. Id. at 1320;
Eggleston, 873 F.2d at 248.
57 One 1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d at 1318.

58 Id. at 1318-19. White's heirs also claimed that due to the penal nature of
§ 881 (a) (6), civil forfeiture under that provision should abate upon the wrongdoer's
death. Id. at 1319. The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention, stating that Congress

intended § 881 to primarily serve remedial purposes. Id.
59 Id. at 1320.
60 Id. The court opined that, pursuant to the relation back doctrine, "no third
party can acquire a legally valid interest in the property forfeited from anyone other
than the government after the illegal act takes place ....
[U]nless a claimant has a
claim to the property forfeited which existed prior to the time the acts take place
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61
ers could not become owners, regardless of their innocence.
While conceding that an illegal act generally invalidates subsequent transfers, some courts have exempted from this rule those
transfers made to individuals qualifying as bona fide purchasers for
value.6 2 United States v. One 1983 Mercedes Benz 380SL6 exemplifies
this sentiment. 64 In One 1983 Mercedes Benz, the Sixth Circuit addressed the forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4),65 of an
automobile used to transport cocaine.' The lessor of the vehicle
asserted innocent ownership under § 881(a) (4) (C).67
The court attempted to reconcile that innocent owner provision with the relation back provision in § 881(h). 6 8 Due to the
sparse legislative history of § 881 (a) (4) (C), the court analogized to
the history of § 881 (a) (6) .69 As a result of its analysis, the Sixth

which bring on the forfeiture, then the innocent owner provision of the statute has
no application." Id.
In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit relied upon its holding in In re Metmor Financial,
Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 1987), in which the court held that the United States
could not obtain through forfeiture a superior interest in property to that of a third
party whose interest arose prior to the acts giving rise to forfeiture. One 1985 Nissan,
889 F.2d at 1326. Although the Metmor court did not specifically consider the third
party's innocent owner status, the Fourth Circuit explained, the reasoning of Metmor
extends to the application of the innocent owner provision of § 881 (a) (6). Id. Thus,
the court concluded, after the illegal act occurs, a third party cannot acquire a valid
interest in forfeited property from any party other than the United States. Id.
61 Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that its reasoning in One 1985 Nissan was fortified
by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Caplin & Dysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617
(1989). One 1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d at 1320. In Caplin & Diysdale,Judge Widener explained, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)
were valid. Id. at 1321. The Court, the judge continued, based its argument on the
doctrine of relation back and noted that subsequent dealings of the possessor cannot
defeat the interests of the United States that vest through forfeiture. Id. (quoting
Caplin & hysdale, 491 U.S. at 627 (quoting United States v. Stowell, 113 U.S. 1, 19
(1890))).
62 See, e.g., United States v. 2901 S.W. 118th Court, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla.
1988) ("[T]he innocent owner exception to forfeiture under section 881 also protects
bona fide purchasers for value.").
63 No. 89-3123, 1991 WL 276262 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1991).
64 See id. at *5 ("[0] ne who claims to be a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value
and without notice has standing to assert the innocent owner defense ... .
65 For the text of § 881 (a) (4), see supra note 4.
66 One 1983 Mercedes Benz, 1991 WL 276262 at *1.
67 Id. See supra note 4 for the text of § 881 (a) (4) (C).
68 See One 1983 Mercedes, 1991 WL 276262, at *3-5.
69 Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
With regard to the legislative history of
§ 881(a) (6) the court quoted Senator Nunn, who announced that prior to the addition of § 881 (a) (6) the statute could have been construed to reach innocent parties.
Id. at *4 (citation omitted). Senator Nunn further stated, the court noted, that "[Congress] did add a provision... to make it clear that [in the case of] a bona fide party
who had no knowledge or consent to the property he owns having been derived from
an illegal transaction . . . forfeiture would not occur." Id. (citation omitted).

400

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:388

Circuit concluded that the retroactive vesting of § 881 (h) did not
operate to the detriment of innocent purchasers for value under
§ 881 (a) (6).7°
In United States v. 298 Northwest Forty-Fifth Street,7 1 the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida duplicated the Sixth Circuit's reasoning and achieved a similar outcome.72 In 298 Northwest
Forty-Fifth Street, Peter Boschian sold narcotics from a home that he
purchased in the name of his mother, Virginia Boschian. 73 Following the government's seizure of the residence, Virginia Boschian
protested, claiming that she qualified as an innocent owner. 4
The district court rejected Mrs. Boschian's defense, noting
that only a bona fide purchaser can deprive the government of forfeit title. 75 Because ownership of the home had passed without
consideration, the court concluded that Mrs. Boschians had acquired the status of donee, rather than bona fide purchaser.7 6
Thus, the district court opined, the forfeiture provision of § 881 (h)
operated undisturbed, thereby vesting title in the United States.7 7
Rather than adhering to one of the aforementioned approaches, the Third Circuit, in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,78 proposed a view of its own. 71 The Court observed that
70 Id. at *5. The court explained that "[§ 881 (h) ] ... was obviously not intended to
operate in derogation of the rights of innocent purchasers under either paragraph 6
or 7." Id. at *4.
71 804 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
72 See id. at 325 ("This Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit's holding which clearly
states 'that one who claims to be a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value and
without notice has standing to assert the innocent owner defense .... .'" Id. (quoting
One 1983 Mercedes Benz, 1991 WL 276262 at *5).
73 Id. at 324. At trial, Boschian testified that he transferred the title of the property
to his mother in order to manipulate both her and the system. Id.
74 Id. at 326.
75 Id. at 325-26. The court noted that "[a]ccording to the Uniform Commercial
Code, to qualify as a bona fide purchaser, there needs to be an exchange for value.
The U.C.C. defines value broadly, therefore, almost any purchaser will give value, with
the notable exception of a donee." Id. (citations omitted). The court then concluded
that Mrs. Boschian was merely a donee. Id. at 326. Mrs. Boschian admitted that she
did not exchange value in return for the property, the court explained, and claimed
that the funds she received from her son constituted a loan. Id. The court rejected
Mrs. Boschian's claim, observing that other testimony in the case was inconsistent
with her assertion that the contribution was a loan. Id.

76 Id.
77 See id. Because Mrs. Boschian was not a bona fide purchaser for value, the court
concluded, she was not entitled to contest the forfeiture of the property. Id.
78 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), affd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). See supra notes 32-34
and accompanying text for additional discussion on the Third Circuit's decision in 92
Buena Vista Avenue.
79 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 101-02. First, the Third Circuit specifically refuted the bona fide purchaser approach posited by district court. Id. at 101, 102. The
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§ 881 (h) only vests in the government title to property described in
subsection (a). ° Subsection (a), the court added, specifically excludes from forfeiture property owned by innocent parties.8 1 As
such, the Court reasoned, property held by innocent persons is not
among property described in subsection (a). Therefore, the Court
concluded, subsection (h) cannot vest title to such property in the
2
government.8
Confronted with this competing case law, the United States
Supreme Court decided United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue."3 Responding to whether a donee of drug proceeds who uses those proceeds to purchase real property may assert an innocent owner
defense,8 4 the Court embraced the inclusionary approach pioneered by the Third Circuit. 5
Writing for the plurality,8 6 Justice Stevens expounded briefly
on the historical foundations of modern forfeiture law 7 and distinguished between the modern civil forfeiture statute and its predecourt stated that limiting the definition of "owner" to bona fide purchasers would
"contravene the express legislative intent that we interpret 'owner' broadly." Id.
80 Id. For the text of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a), see supra note 4.
81 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102. See supra note 4 for the text of subsection
(a) of § 881.
The court concluded that despite her status as a donee, Goodwin qualified as an
innocent owner. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102. The Third Circuit observed
that "the innocent owner provision... in no way limits the term 'owner' to a bona
fide purchaser for value. Furthermore, in United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known
as 6109 Grubb Road... we determined... that ... the term 'owner' should be broadly

interpreted." Id. at 101-02 (citing United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 625
n.4 (3d Cir. 1989)). In 6109 Grubb Road the Third Circuit examined innocent ownership in the context of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7), but had occasion to analyze and comment on § 881 (a) (6) as well. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625. After reviewing the
statute's legislative history, the court endorsed an interpretation of "owner" which
embraced any person with a legitimate legal or equitable interest in the property in
question. Id. at 625 n.4 (citation omitted). Claiming adherence to its prior interpretation of "owner," the Third Circuit in 92 Buena Vista Ave. extended innocent owner
protection to donees. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102.
82 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102. On this point, the court observed that "one
must first ascertain whether the property at issue is not forfeitable because of an innocent owner defense before applying section 881(h)." Id. The Third Circuit further
noted that interpreting § 881 (h) to preclude all claims by subsequent owners would
emasculate § 881 (a) (6)'s innocent owner defense. Id.
83 113 S.Ct. 1126 (1993).
84 Id. at 1129.
85 See id. at 1134 ("The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the protection
afforded to innocent owners is not limited to bona fide purchasers.").
86 Id. at 1129. The plurality consisted of Justices Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor,
and Souter. Id.
87 Id. at 1131-33 (citations omitted). See supranote 2 for a discussion of the historical underpinnings of modem forfeiture law.
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cessors.8 8 Thereafter, Justice Stevens succinctly delivered the
plurality's rendition of the term "owner," asserting that its scope
was not limited to bona fide purchasers for value.8 9 Adhering to
the Third Circuit's broad construction of § 881 (a) (6), 9 the Justice
observed that Congress had used the word "owner" three times in
§ 881 (a) (6) and each time had conspicuously refrained from modifying it.9 Thus, the plurality opined, no concrete basis existed for
a finding that the legislature intended to distinguish between donees and bona fide purchasers.9 2
Justice Stevens next dispensed with the government's contention that the common law and statutory principles of relation back
precluded a donee from acquiring title to real property purchased
with drug proceeds.9 3 Although questioning its applicability, 9 4 the
Justice addressed the government's use of the common law relation back doctrine.9" Justice Stevens challenged the government's
view that the vesting of title in the United States occurs immediately upon the occurrence of the event giving rise to forfeiture,
asserting instead that vesting requires definitive steps on the part of
the United States. 9 6 The Justice advanced that, as an exigency to
88 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1133-34. Justice Stevens observed that, prior to
the 1978 amendment, 21 U.S.C § 881 so resembled the early forfeiture statutes that
reference to case law interpreting those initial statutes had been profitable. See id.
The Justice cautioned, however, that since the 1984 amendments to § 881, which added provisions allowing for the forfeiture of proceeds and the protection of innocent
owners, the common law had become somewhat inadequate and so should be employed discretely. Id. at 1134.
89 Id. After embarking on an explanation of why the term "owner" extends beyond bona fide purchasers for value, the court acknowledged that the government's
argument rested not on an interpretation of the term "owner," but rather on an application of the relation back doctrine. Id.
90 See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1991), affd,
113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (holding that one "need not be a bona fide purchaser for value
to raise an innocent owner defense").
91 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134. Directing attention to the word "owner"
in 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6), the Court commented that "[s]uch language is sufficiently
unambiguous to foreclose any contention that it applies only to bona fide purchasers." Id.
92

Id.

93 Id. at 1137.
94 Id. at 1135. The Court noted that the common law doctrine of relation back
traditionally applied to forfeitures of property actually used to commit a crime. Id.
(citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-84 (1974)). On
this basis, the Court noted "[b ] ecause we are not aware of any common-law precedent
for treating proceeds traceable to an unlawful exchange as a fictional wrongdoer subject to forfeiture, it is not entirely clear that the common-law relation back doctrine is
applicable." Id.
95 Id. at 1135-37 (citations omitted).
96 Id. at 1136. In support of its position, the Court quoted ChiefJustice Marshall's
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vesting, the government must first obtain a judgment in its favor.9 7
A valid judgment, the Justice continued, carries the government's
title back to the moment of the illegal event.9 8 In the interim (the
period after the illegal event and before ajudgment in the government's favor), the Court concluded, persons acquiring innocent
ownership in the property, even if by gift, may defeat the
forfeiture.9 9
After distinguishing between the common law doctrine and
the amended § 881,100 Justice Stevens scrutinized the language of
§§ 881 (a) (6) and 881 (h). 10 ' Rejecting the government's argument
that § 881 (h) prevents proceeds of illegal transactions from vesting
in any party but the government, the Justice offered his impression
of the interplay between the two sections. 1 12 The Justice first observed that § 881 (a) (6) exempts from forfeiture those proceeds belonging to innocent owners.'0 3 The Justice next read § 881(h) as
operating to vest title in the United States only in property "forfeitable" under § 881 (a).1 ° 4 Property owned by innocent parties, the
Justice concluded, is not forfeitable under § 881 (a) (6) and therefore cannot be affected by § 881(h). °5 With regard to property
exempt from forfeiture under § 881 (a) (6), Justice Stevens reasoned, § 881(h) is moot.'0 6
Before closing, the Court declined to address the issue of
whether, to qualify as an innocent owner, a transferee must be unaware of the illegal act giving rise to the forfeiture at the time the act
opinion in United States v. Grundy, where the Chief Justice asserted that the government must take legal steps before title to property subject to forfeiture vests in the
United States. Id. at 1135 (quoting United States v. Grundy & Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 337, 350-51 (1806)).
97 Id. at 1136.
98

Id.

99 Id. On this point, the Court posited that "[u] ntil the government... win [s] such
ajudgement... someone else owns the property .... [and] may therefore invoke any
defense available to the owner of the property before the forfeiture is decreed." Id.
100 Id. Justice Stevens noted that Congress had codified the common law rule of
relation back, but cautioned that "[b]ecause ... [the common law] rule was never
applied to the forfeiture of proceeds, and because the statute now contains an innocent owner defense, it may not be immediately clear that they lead to the same result."
Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1136-37.
103 Id. at 1136.
104 Id. In defense of this proposition, the Justice refers to the Senate Report from
the 1984 amendment which states that § 881(h) relates "only to 'property which is
subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a).'" Id. (citation omitted).
105 Id. at 1136-37.
106 Id. at 1137. On this point the Justice remarked that "§ 881 (a) (6) must allow an
assertion of the [innocent owner] defense before § 881(h) applies." Id.
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occurs or at the time of receipt of the property. 10 7 Referring to the
respondent's brief, the Justice merely noted that the respondent
had assumed the burden of proving the latter proposition.10
Concurring in the judgement, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, began with an assault on the government's view of the
common law relation back doctrine. 9 Restating the plurality's impression of the common law, Justice Scalia stressed that vesting
transpires only upon the entry of ajudgement in the government's
favor.1 10 The Justice then added that Congress had codified this
common law rule when it promulgated 21 U.S.C. 881 (h). 1 11
The concurrence and the plurality then parted company as
Justice Scalia criticized Justice Stevens's impression of the relationship between §§ 881 (a) (6) and 881(h).1 12 The plurality, observed
Justice Scalia, held that a donee's interest that is acquired after the
illegal event is not invalidated by retroactive vesting. 1 TheJustice
noted that the plurality premised this conclusion on its belief that
§ 881(h) affects only "forfeitable" property. 1 4 Scrutinizing the
statute's plain language, Justice Scalia asserted that § 881 (h) encompasses all property "described" in subsection (a), not merely all
property "forfeitable" under that section.1 15 Subscribing to the
government's theory, the concurring Justice opined that property
107 Id.

108 Id. at 1137-38. On this issue, the respondent's brief provided:
The statute should be read to require that the owner assert his lack of
knowledge of the criminal transaction at the time of the transfer. Since
Goodwin did not have any knowledge of the alleged criminal transaction until long after the transfer, she should be protected by the innocent owner defense.
Id. at 1138 n.25 (citation omitted).
109 Id. at 1138-42 (citations omitted) (ScaliaJ., concurring). Regarding the government's view on the common law relation back doctrine, Justice Scalia chided,
"[b]ecause the Government believes that the doctrine operates at the time of the illegal act, it finds the term 'relation back' to be 'something of a misnomer.' But the
name of the doctrine is not wrong; the Government's understanding of it is." Id. at
1138 (citation omitted).
110 Id. The concurrence noted that this explication of § 881 (h) makes sense within
the scheme of statutory forfeiture procedures. Id. at 1140 (Scalia, J., concurring). It
is clear from the procedures governing § 881, Justice Scalia asserted, that the United
States cannot gain title to forfeited property until a decree of forfeiture is made. Id.
The Justice further observed that "if ... legal tite to the property actually vested in
the United States at the time of the illegal act, judicial forfeiture proceedings would
never be 'necessary.'" Id.
111 Id. at 1139 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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held by innocent owners remains among the property "described"
in § 881(a).1 1 6 Because vesting occurs at the time ofjudgment and
not at the time of the illegal event, Justice Scalia distinguished,
§ 881(h) has no effect on prejudgment transfers.' 1 7 Reuniting
with the plurality, the concurrence concluded that, if in fact the
donee had innocently acquired the property, section (h) could not
operate to divest her. 118
Finally, Justice Scalia rebuked the plurality for its failure to answer the question of whether an "innocent" owner is a person who
has no knowledge of the illegal event when the event occurs or
instead, is a person who had no knowledge of the illegal event
when she receives the proceeds of that event.1 19 Unlike the plurality, the concurrence deemed the respondent's brief indeterminate
on the issue.' 2 ° Despite the respondent's adoption of the second
alternative, the concurring Justice deemed premature the plurality's decision to estop the respondent from changing that
21
position.1
Justice Kennedy, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice
White, launched the dissent, a methodical offensive on the logic of
the reasoning of Justices Stevens and Scalia. 122 Justice Kennedy
opined that the plurality and concurrence had improvidently focused their arguments on the donee when, in fact, the donor had
pre-determined the donee's ownership rights. 1 23 While in the donor's possession, the Justice observed, the proceeds unquestionably
constituted "property subject to forfeiture" under § 881 (a). 124 As
116 Id. Justice Scalia admitted that the concurrence's interpretation of§ 881(h) did
not coincide precisely with the statutory language. Id. at 1140 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
TheJustice observed that the statute demands that "title shall vest in the United States
upon commission of the act giving rise to the forfeiture," while the concurrence reads
it to say that title "shall vest in the United States upon forfeiture, effective as of the
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." Id. Justice Scalia claimed that the
imprecision was forgivable. Id. (citations omitted).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1140.
119 Id. at 1142 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
120 Id.

121 Id. Justice Scalia noted that the question of whether the respondent should be
estopped from changing those positions was not ripe for consideration because (1)
petitioner had not yet attempted such a change, and (2) the issue was not properly
before the court. Id.
122 Id. at 1143-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 1143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In this regard, Justice Kennedy advanced
that "the threshold and dispositive inquiry is whether the donee had any ownership
rights that required a separate forfeiture, given that her title was defective and subject
to the Government's claim from the outset." Id.
124 Id. The dissent remarked that "[t]he dealer did notjust know of the illegal acts;
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such, the Justice averred, the donor's title became defective or
"voidable" prior to the transfer 1 25 under well-established principles
1 26
of commercial and property law.
27
Identifying and then applying the rules of voidable title,' Jushe performed them." Id. As long as the wrongdoer possessed the illegal asset, Justice
Kennedy asserted, the property was subject to forfeiture. Id.
125 Id. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For a critique ofJustice Kennedy's reasoning, see Moshe Heching, Recent Development, 16 HAItv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835, 844-48
(1993) (citations omitted). Heching opines thatJustice Kennedy's interpretation of
§ 881 (a) (6), while "comport[ing] with 'settled principles of property transfers, trusts
and commercial transactions' ... slights the design of the legislature in enacting the
innocent owner defense-to protect the rights of parties who are at most peripherally
related, and usually entirely unrelated, to the drug crimes in question." Id. at 845
(citation omitted).
126 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Justice
utilized the Restatement of Trusts, the Restatement of Property, and the Uniform
Commercial Code as support for the dissent's "voidable title" theory. Id.
With regard to bona fide purchasers, the Restatement of Trusts states:,
If the trustee in breach of trust transfers trust property to, or creates a
legal interest in the subject matter of the trust in, a person who takes for
value and without notice of the breach of trust, and who is not knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction, the latter holds the interest so
transferred or created free of the trust, and is under no liability to the
beneficiary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 284 (1959). The restatement further explains
that "[i]f the trustee in breach of trust transfers the property to a person who is not a
bona fide purchaser and the transferee transfers the property to a bona fide purchaser, the latter takes the property free of the trust." Id. at § 287. Finally, with regard to donees, the Restatement indicates that "[i]f the trustee in breach of trust
transfers trust property and no value is given for the transfer, the transferee does not
hold the property free of the trust, although he had no notice of the trust." Id. at 289.
On the topic of bona fide purchasers, the Restatement of Property states:
If the conduct of a donee of a donative transfer causes another person
reasonably to conclude that the donor owns the subject matter of the
donative transfer and such person acting in good faith purchases for a
fair and adequate consideration from the donor the subject matter of
the donative transfer, such bona fide purchaser from the donor is entitled to the subject matter of the donative transfer as against the donee.
The donee is entitled to receive from the donor the value of the subject
matter of the donative transfer.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 34.9 (1992).
127 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Justice
explained:
The primary rules of voidable title are manageable and few in number.
The first is that one who purchases property in good faith and for value
from the holder of voidable title obtains good title. The second rule,
reciprocal to the first, is that one who acquires property from a holder
of voidable title other than by a good faith purchase for value obtains
nothing beyond what the transferor held. The third rule is that a transferee who acquires property from a good faith purchaser for value or
one of his lawful successors obtains good tide, even if the transferee did
not pay value or act in good faith.
Id. (citations omitted).
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tice Kennedy explained that a donee can acquire no better title
than that of her benefactor.12 8 Therefore, the Justice noted, a-donee obtains an inherently flawed interest in illegal proceeds, regardless of her innocence.1 9 Only a bona fide purchaser for value,
the dissent added, can purify tainted or voidable title and make it
unassailable by the government. 30 In the case at bar, Justice Kennedy concluded, the recipient of the proceeds had passed no consideration and, therefore, had not earned the status or privilege
31
accompanying a bona fide purchase.'
Justice Kennedy next demonstrated the plurality opinion's
debilitating effect on forfeiture's objective of diminishing the economic might of drug traffickers. 132 The Justice first defended that
limiting the innocent owner exception to bona fide purchasers still
accomplishes the aforementioned goal. 133 In the context of a bona
fide purchase, the Justice reasoned, the criminal exchanges the
proceeds for something he deems their equivalent in value.13 4 The
product of this latter transaction, the Justice proceeded, may in
turn be confiscated by the government, thereby vicariously depriv1 35
ing the criminal of the proceeds of his illegal acts.
This strategy, the dissent continued, obviously fails in the context of a donative transfer.' 36 Where a criminal has gifted the proceeds, Justice Kennedy cautioned, the criminal has acquired
nothing tangible as a substitute for the proceeds. 13 7 Instead, the
dissent deduced, the criminal has transferred the proceeds either
to favor the donee or to shield the proceeds so that they may be reacquired at a later date.' 3 8 In either event, Justice Kennedy admonished, by stripping the donee of the proceeds, the government
128 Id. (citations omitted).
129 Id. The dissent noted that the donee of illicit proceeds "has no valid claim to
the proceeds, not because she has done anything wrong but because she stands in the
shoes of one who has." Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Regarding consideration, the dissent added that the question of whether Goodwin's marital rights constituted value could be
explored on remand. Id. at 1145 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
132 Id. (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy noted that "the plurality's opinion leaves
the forfeiture scheme that is the centerpiece of the Nation's drug enforcement laws in
quite a mess." Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.

136 Id. The Justice commented that "[i]n [donative transfer] cases, the criminal's
economic power cannot be diminished by seizing what he received in the . . . exchange, for he received no tangible value." Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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deprives the criminal of the value of his illicit activities. 13 9 By not
allowing the government to pierce the donative veil, the Justice
criminals to savor, diconcluded, the plurality effectively allows
1 40
gains.
ill-gotten
their
rectly or indirectly,
At first glance, the Court's attempt to rescue the "innocent
owner" exception from the government's exclusionary ax appears
valiant. 41 Upon closer examination, however, it becomes evident
that the Court's inclusionary position inflicts equal injury, taking as
its victim the "relation back" amendment. The government's rendition of §§ 881 (h) and 881 (a) (6) admittedly works a disservice to
the latter provision; so much so that even the government appears
to doubt that its initial reading of the provisions is entirely tenable. 42 Without doubt, the government's exclusionary interpretation of § 881 (h) eviscerates the innocent owner provision in
§ 881(a) (6) as it applies to proceeds. The logic supporting this
criticism is simple: any transfer involving the proceeds of an illegal
transaction necessarily post-dates the illegal transaction giving rise
to those proceeds. The government's uncharitable reading of the
relation back provision, therefore, begets an implausible corollary-that Congress created a worthless defense in § 881 (a) (6)43
In its zeal to defend the "innocent owner" provision of
§ 881(a) (6), the Court commits some tactical errors of its own;
these errors claim as a casualty the relation back provision of
§ 881(h). Analyzing the common law 144 as well as the statute, the
Id.
Id.; see Heching, supra note 125, at 844 ("InJustice Kennedy's eyes, by allowing a
donee the benefit of the innocent owner defense, the plurality afforded drug offenders a new avenue to 'wash' their ill-gotten gains and elude the civil forfeiture laws.").
141 See Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S.
Ct. 1126 (1993) (No. 91-781) (stating the United States's position that "[n]o party
other than the United States can obtain an ownership interest in property after the
events giving rise to civil forfeiture under federal statute.").
142 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1135 & n.18 (citation omitted). The Court
noted that the government's strict view of the effect of the relation back amendment
would "effectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every imaginable
case in which proceeds could be forfeited." Id. at 1135. Faced with this anomaly, the
government, at oral argument, "suggested that a narrow interpretation of the word
'proceeds' would 'probably' prevent this absurdity." Id. at 1135 n.18 (citation
omitted).
143 See id. at 1135 ("[T]he Government's submission would effectively eliminate the
innocent owner defense in almost every imaginable case in which proceeds could be
forfeited.").
144 The plurality makes selective and damaging use of "relation back" common law;
in its haste to establish that retroactive vesting is not "self executing," the Court reproduces a passage from United States v. Stowegl which bolsters the government's position
more effectively than its own. See id. at 1136 (quoting United States v. Stowell, 133
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890)). The language quoted by the 92 Buena Vista Ave. Court states
139
140
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plurality concedes that the government's title to forfeit property in
fact "relates back" to the time of the prohibited act.' 45 The court
tempers this position, however, by mandating that the government
must "win" ajudgment before vesting occurs.1 46 Using this requirement as a springboard, the plurality makes an incredible leap in
logic: it concludes that all innocent transferees who take prior to
the judgment maintain their ownership status despite relation

back.147 The concurring opinion arrives at this same destination,
albeit by a different and less circuitous route.' 4 8
Regardless of the means, the contorted end espoused by both

the plurality and concurrence flies in the face of both the statute's
plain language1 49 and its legislative history1 5 ° At worst, this holding encourages drug dealers to "gift" their illicit wealth to straw

persons' 51 with the intent of subsequent retrieval. 5 2 At best, the
decision amounts to judicial endorsement of charitable money
laundering.
that "the forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act... the
condemnation when obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate
sales ... even to purchasers in good faith." Id. (quoting Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17)
(emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
147 See id.
145

146

148
149
150
gress

See id. at 1138-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See supra note 4 (setting forth the relevant text of § 881).
In a Senate Report accompanying the addition of §§ 881(h) and 881(7), Connoted the following:
The problem of pre-conviction dispositions of property subject to criminal forfeiture is further complicated by the question of whether, simply
by transferring an asset to a third party, a defendant may shield it from
forfeiture. In civil forfeitures, such transfers are voidable, for the property is
considered "tainted"from the time of its prohibited use or acquisition.
S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3379 (emphasis added); see also Brief for the United States at 4 n.1, United States v. 92
Buena Vista Ave, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (No. 91-781) (citation omitted) (noting that a
Joint Explanatory Statement stated that drug proceeds are subject to forfeiture even
when they are involved in legitimate transactions).
151 A "straw" is defined as "[a] 'front'; a third party who is put up in name only to
take part in a transaction." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1421 (6th ed. 1990).

152 In this regard, the government warns:
It is not difficult for even close friends or relatives of a drug dealer to
contend .

.

. that they were unknowing recipients of drug proceeds-

and it is difficult to assemble evidence rebutting such a claim. By placing title to drug proceeds in another person, therefore, a drug trafficker
can erect a serious obstacle in the way of the government's efforts to
obtain forfeiture of assets that are demonstrably traceable to drug
transactions.
Brief for the United States at 43, United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave. 113 S. Ct. 1126
(1993) (No. 91-781).
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In enacting 21 U.S.C. § 881, Congress clearly and unequivocally announced the statute's intended purpose and effect-to dis153
suade criminals by depriving them of the "value" of their crimes.
In formulating its holding, the Court dismissed entirely one of the
many "values" of money-that it can be given away. 1 54 Assuming
that the criminal legitimately donates the proceeds, and further
assuming that the donee is truly "innocent," the modern day
55
"Robin Hood" has nonetheless been enriched by his crime.1
Sadly enough, this enrichment comes with the Court's inadvertent
blessing.
The dissent, recognizing the tragedy of the Court's decree,
poses a viable, well reasoned alternative; it proposes limiting the
innocent owner defense, as it relates to proceeds, to bona fide purchasers for value.' 5 6 This theory, espoused by several lower
courts, 1 5 7 enables the relation back amendment to retroactively
vest title to all proceeds in the government, excepting only those
proceeds transferred to bona fide purchasers.'
As to those excepted proceeds, however, the government is not entirely without
recourse. Rather, the government may seize the secondary proceeds resulting from the bona fide purchase, thereby depriving the
criminal of economic gain.
The bona fide purchaser exception represents a compromise
between the extreme inclusionary and exclusionary approaches, esSee supra notes 5, 8, 9, and 12 for legislative history supporting this proposition.
See Brief for the United States at 42, United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S.
Ct. 1126 (1993) (No. 91-781) ("Money has value to a drug dealer, like anyone else, in
part because it can be given away.").
155 See id. Arguing against the Third Circuit's interpretation of § 881, which reemerged in the Supreme Court's holding, the government observed that "[the
court's] interpretation would allow drug dealers to distribute their wealth to minor
children, other unknowing family members, companions, and others with whom they
seek to curry favor.... [T]hey could even enjoy the use of very valuable property that
they have given to their most intimate companions." Id.
156 See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1144 (1993) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
157 See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of courts
recognizing the bona fide purchaser exception).
158 At least one commentator has endorsed this position, observing that, because a
criminal holds "voidable title" by operation of the relation back doctrine,
then by analogy to U.C.C. §2-403, he can pass good title to a good-faith
purchaser. If the criminal retains title, or tries to clear title through a
sham transaction to someone who is not a good-faith purchaser, then
the property will be forfeited. But if a good faith subsequent purchaser
acquires the property, then title will not be voided, and the innocent
party will be protected.
Mark A. Janowski, Note, Tempering the Relation Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to CivilForfeiturein Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. RiEv. 165, 188 (1990) (citation omitted).
153
154
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poused by the plurality and the government respectively. Unfortunately, the plurality has failed to recognize the bona fide purchaser
exception as perhaps the only means by which to give meaningful
the "innocent
effect to both the "relation back" doctrine and
1 59
owner" proviso as they apply to illegal proceeds.
Michael P. Martirano

159 For an opposing view, see Heching, supra note 125, at 844 ("[T]he court correctly interprets the civil forfeiture statute and its innocent owner defense, providing
a critical and indispensable safeguard against the government's overzealousness in
enforcing civil forfeitures.").

